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ruling, which will eliminate the possibility of its operating
oppressively in deserving cases. First, while the defendant has
no right of further appeal upon the legality of the penalty, the
supreme court might in a sufficiently meritorious case, grant
review under its plenary supervisory jurisdiction. Second, if the
trial de novo in the appeal to the district court had been limited
to the question of defendant's guilt or innocence, the issue of
constitutionality of the penalty could have been presented in a
direct appeal to the supreme court. That would be a case of
concurrent appellate jurisdiction, upon separate and distinct
questions.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Henry G. McMahon*
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Seven cases decided during the past term involved serious
questions concerning the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the
trial court. In two of these,' a closely-divided court held the
gambling abatement statute2 invalid because of an unconstitu-
tional grant of territorial jurisdiction. Both cases presented
appeals from judgments of the district court sustaining excep-
tions of no right and no cause of action to proceedings brought to
enjoin defendants from continued operation of their gambling
houses. These exceptions were leveled at the unconstitutionality
of the basic statute in permitting institution of abatement suits
in any district court of the state, regardless of the location of the
nuisance sought to be enjoined, in violation of Sections 31 and 81
of Article VII of the Constitution, and of the due process clause
of the Constitutions3 of the state and of the United States. The
chief justice, speaking for the majority of the court, accepted the
argument of the defendants in pronouncing the invalidity of the
basic statute. Two of the dissenting judges, Justices Hamiter
and Hawthorne, adhered to their original positions4 that the
* Dean and Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. Tanner v. Beverly Country Club; Ellzey v. Original Club Forest, 217
La. 1043, 47 So. 2d 905 (1950), noted in 25 Tulane L. Rev. 399 (1951).
2. La. Act 192 of 1920, as amended by La. Acts 49 of 1938 and 120 of 1940,
La. R.S. (1950) 13:4721 through 13:4727.
3. La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 2; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV.
4. These cases were considered by the supreme court about eighteen
months before, when judgments of the trial court sustaining exceptions to
the jurisdiction were reversed. See Tanner v. Beverly Country Club; Ellzey
v. Original Club Forest, 214 La. 791, 38 So. 2d 783 (1948), discussed in The
Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1948-1949 Term, 10 LouisIANA
LAW REVIEW 120, 237 (1950).
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statute under attack permitted institution of the abatement pro-
ceeding only in the parish where the nuisance was being com-
mitted. As a further reason for his inability to subscribe to the
majority opinion, Justice Hawthorne took the position that, since
the abatement suits were brought in the parish where the defen-
dants were domiciled and where the alleged gambling houses
were located, there was no basis for the defendants' complaint
that the legislation in question deprived them of due process of
law. Justice McCaleb agreed with the position taken by the
majority that the statute permits the abatement proceedings to
be brought in any district court of the state; but found in such
legislative provision nothing inimical to any express or implied
constitutional restraint upon legislation. Such a provision, says
Justice McCaleb, relates merely to venue, not territorial juris-
diction; and no more offends the constitutional provisions invoked
than do any of the exceptions to the general rule of suit at defen-
dant's domicile announced in the Code of Practice. The impact
of these two cases upon the twin subjects of jurisdiction and
venue are discussed elsewhere. 5
The French Civil Code expressly provides where actions to
partition property belonging to the community are to be brought.6
Both of the Louisiana codes are silent on the subject. The ques-
tion was presented for the first time in Louisiana in Demourelle v.
Allen,7 where an action was brought in Plaquemines Parish to
partition immovables located in that parish and owned by the
community formerly existing between the litigants, whose divorce
had been decreed in Orleans Parish. The defendant husband,
who previously had prayed for the partition of the community
estate in the divorce proceedings in Orleans Parish, filed excep-
tions to the jurisdiction ratione personae of the Plaquemines
court and of lis pendens, which were overruled by the trial court.
In the absence of express provisions of positive law, both litigants
were forced to rely upon analogical extensions of code provisions
to sustain their respective positions as to venue: the plaintiff,
upon those articles providing that suits for the partition of
immovables owned by co-proprietors should be brought in the
5. See Comment 12 LOUISIANA LAw RsviEw 210 (1952).
6. Art. 1476, French Civil Code, providing that the partition of the com-
munity is subject to all of the rules specified for the partition of successions
among co-heirs. Art. 2890, La. Civil Code of 1870, like its counterpart-Art.
1872, French Civil Code-provides that the rules concerning the partition of
successions apply to partners.
7. 218 La. 603, 50 So. 2d 208 (1950).
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parish where the property is situated; the defendant, on those
articles providing for the venue of actions to partition property
owned by co-heirs. The court, holding that suits for the partition
of community property, like suits for the partition of succession
and partnership property, were ancillary to the main proceeding,
overruled defendant's exception to the jurisdiction ratione per-
sonae, but sustained his exception of lis pendens. The decision
not only appears to be sound, but seems to provide a workable
rule for the future.
In Key v. Salley" plaintiff sought to annul an administratrix'
sale of property, on the ground that the court's jurisdiction over
the succession proceedings had been terminated prior to rendi-
tion of the order decreeing the sale, by a judgment placing dece-
dent's widow and son into possession of the effects of the
succession. The judgment of possession, on which the entire
result of the case hinged, was a most unusual one, which not
only recognized the decedent's widow and son and sent them
into possession, but expressly reserved the right of the widow to
administer the succession or to claim the widow's homestead, if
she so desired. These reservations were held by the supreme
court to strike the judgment of possession with nullity, as con-
stituting a prohibited conditional acceptance of a succession. As
a consequence, the order of the district court decreeing the subse-
quent sale of the property in question was held valid.
In Rathbone Lumber & Supply Company v. Falgout9 plain-
tiff had sold building materials to the named defendant, who had
used them in constructing a building in Plaquemines. Parish for
Pelas, under an oral contract. Both contractor and owner having
failed to pay the price of these materials, plaintiff instituted pro-
ceedings in Jefferson Parish: (1) to recover judgment in solido
against Falgout and Pelas; and (2) to enforce plaintiff's material-
man's privilege against the building in Plaquemines. Pelas, a
resident of the latter parish, excepted to the proceedings on the
ground of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter. The trial court sustained Pelas' exception to the
venue, but overruled his objections to the jurisdiction. On appeal,
the supreme court reversed both aspects of the trial court's judg-
ment. Since both defendants were liable in, solido, and Falgout
admittedly was a resident of Jefferson Parish where the proceed-
ings were filed, the district court there was held competent to
8. 218 La. 922, 51 So. 2d 390 (1951).
9. 218 La. 629, 50 So. 2d 295 (1951).
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render a personal judgment against Pelas, even though he resided
in Plaquemines Parish. But since the proceedings to enforce the
privilege on the building were in rem, and the statute conferring
the privilege provided for an enforcement of the privilege only
in the parish where the building was located, the district court
in Jefferson was held incompetent to enforce the privilege.
In Inman v. Harris'0 plaintiff sued a Louisiana citizen to
recover damages for "waste" committed on a Mississippi planta-
tion by an alleged life-tenant, whose succession had been accepted
unconditionally by the defendant. An exception to the juris-
diction ratione materiae of the trial court was sustained in the
court of first instance and was affirmed on appeal. Since litiga-
tion to determine the title to the plantation was then pending in
the courts of Mississippi, an action for "waste" was deemed
inseparable therefrom. An unfortunate paraphrasing in the orig-
inal opinion of the language of a common-law compendium, based
upon the concept of a "local action" which was repudiated quite
early in our jurisprudence," was pin-pointed in a per curiam 12
so as to restrict the ruling to the precise facts of the case.
13
PARTIES
The plaintiff in Cohen v. Grace'4 sought to annul an adjudi-
cation of property to him by the state, on the ground that the
latter's title thereto, acquired under a tax adjudication, was
invalid. In the alternative, plaintiff sought to have the state
ordered to pay all paving liens on the property out of the pro-
ceeds of the adjudication to plaintiff. As the tax debtor and the
paving lien holders had not been made parties to the proceeding,
10. 219 La. 55, 52 So. 2d 246 (1951).
11. In Holmes v. Barclay, 4 La. Ann. 63 (1849).
12. "The observation contained in the opinion, that the courts of Louisi-
ana are without jurisdiction of actions ex delicto arising out of waste com-
mitted on lands outside of the State, was intended to be limited to the facts
herein and is not to be viewed as a holding that suits for damages, resulting
from trespass or other acts committed on lands located elsewhere, are, not
cognizable in Louisiana if our courts have jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant." 52 So. 2d 246, 247 (La. 1951).
13. Nothing of unusual importance was involved in the remaining case on
the subject. Property of a nonresident defendant which was sought to be
attached, since its entry into the country had been detained as unclaimed
merchandise by the collector of. customs, acting under authority of the reve-
nue laws. The .United States of.America intervened to except to the juris-
diction ratione materiae of the state court. This exception was maintained
by both the trial and the appellate courts, both holding that as long as the
property was in the collector's custody it was not subject to seizure by the
state courts, and that hence the writ of attachment was void. Universal
Commercial Corp. v. Roani, 218 La. 997, 51 So. 2d 603 (1951).
14. 219 La. 91, 52 So. 2d 297 (1951).
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and as none of the parties to the action questioned plaintiff's title
to the property, but on the contrary asserted the validity thereof,
the supreme court refused to decide the issues presented.
ABANDONMENT OF THE ACTION
Two cases of importance interpreted the code provision 5
relating to dismissal of the action because of non-prosecution for
a period of five years or more. The first' presented a question of
whether this code provision was applicable to executory process.
Pointing out that it applied only to "suits that are capable of
being prosecuted to final judgment," and that a decree ordering
the issuance of the writ of seizure and sale is not a judgment,
but merely an ex parte order in rem, the supreme court held the
abandonment provision inapplicable to executory proceedings.
State v. United Dredging Company 7 presented the much closer
question of whether the abandonment provision applied to actions
instituted by the state. The issue was presented by the motion
of defendant in an action brought to recover taxes to dismiss the
suit because of the failure of plaintiff to take any steps in the
prosecution of the action for more than five years. The trial
court's judgment granting such motion was sought to be reversed
on appeal, under a contention by the state that this code provision
actually was a type of prescription which, under the pertinent
constitutional provision, 8 would not be applicable to the sov-
ereign. Pointing out that the code article actually constituted one
of the general regulations as to the interruption of prescription,
an undivided court overruled the contentions of the state, and
dismissed the action.
PLEADING
The trite rule that payment is an affirmative defense which
must be specially pleaded afforded a simple solution to the pro-
cedural difficulties presented in J. R. Watkins Company v.
Calhoun.19 There, plaintiff and the named defendant executed a
written contract in which defendant agreed to buy various articles
of merchandise required by him for sale and to remit to plaintiff
weekly certain proportions of the proceeds of the sale thereof.
The contract further acknowledged a pre-existing indebtedness of
15. Art. 3519, La. Civil Code of 1870, as amended by La. Act 107 of 1898.
16. Greater New Orleans Homestead Ass'n v. Bell, 219 La. 41, 52 So. 2d
241 (1951).
17. 218 La. 744, 50 So. 2d 826 (1951).
18. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIX, § 16.
19. 219 La. 151, 52 So. 2d 528 (1951).
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$909.62 due plaintiff by defendant. In its petition the plaintiff
company alleged the purchase by defendant of goods and mer-
chandise to the value of $4,214.44; that defendant had paid on
such account the sum of $4,296.18; that this overpayment of $81.74
had been credited on the pre-existing indebtedness, leaving a bal-
ance due thereon of $827.88, for which plaintiff sought judgment.
The trial court sustained an exception of prescription of three
years to this demand. The intermediate appellate court, while
agreeing that the pre-existing indebtedness recognized in the
contract was an acknowledged account governed by the pre-
scription of ten years, took the position that the payments made
by defendant had to be imputed firstly to the oldest obligation-
the pre-existing indebtedness-leaving the balance due on the
new purchases, which constituted an open account. From such an
assumption, an easy leap led the intermediate appellate court to
the conclusion that the three year prescription pleaded by defen-
dant barred enforcement of this balance due on the open account.
In its review of this decision under certiorari, the supreme court
pointed out that this process of reasoning could not be applied,
since the defendant had failed to plead payment of the pre-exist-
ing indebtedness. Judgments of both the lower courts were
reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
For more than a decade, the congestion of the docket of the
supreme court has pressed strongly for a sharp reduction in its
appellate jurisdiction. During the past five years, optimism
mounted over the possibility of the new Louisiana constitution
providing this urgently needed relief, by increasing the court's
minimum jurisdictional amount from $2,000 to $10,000. With the
indefinite tabling last year of all plans for calling a constitutional
convention, hope for relieving a badly-overworked court through
constitutional revision just about vanished. Perhaps this to some
slight extent may explain the court's jealousy with respect. to its
appellate jurisdiction, or the unusually large number of cases
transferred to intermediate appellate courts, during the past term.
In Henwood v. Collector of Revenue2' an alleged income tax
deficiency of less than $2,000 was involved. The basis on which
the taxpayer sought recovery was that the tax in question had
prescribed. Since no question as to the legality or constitutionality
of the taxing statute was involved, the case was transferred.
20. 218 La. 291, 49 So. 2d 17 (1950).
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The trite principle that, when the plaintiff's claims for dam-
ages are palpably exaggerated, they will be disregarded by the
appellate court in considering a question of jurisdiction was
applied in two cases21 decided during the past term. In both, the
supreme court found that the largest amount which the plaintiffs
could possibly recover did not exceed the minimum jurisdictional
amount of the supreme court, and both cases were transferred to
the courts of appeal.
Under the settled jurisprudence of the supreme court, in the
absence of evidence showing the pecuniary amount involved in
a suit, an affidavit of one of the parties as to the amount involved
will be considered by the court.22 It is also well settled that this
affidavit must set forth concrete facts and figures concerning the
amount involved; and that an affidavit presenting merely the
opinion of affiant as to value does not suffice.28 In one of the cases
in which the failure of the record to establish affirmatively the
jurisdiction of the supreme court was sought to be remedied
through the use of an affidavit, the sworn statement of a real
estate broker giving his opinion as to the value of the land
involved in the suit, without furnishing any of the factual bases
on which this opinion was formed, was held insufficient to pre-
vent the transfer of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.2 4 In the
other, the affidavit of one of the parties amply detailed the full
facts, figures, and information establishing the value of the
mineral interest involved as being within the appellate juris-
diction of the supreme court.25
In Papalia v. Hartson26 the plaintiffs sued to recover a $600
deposit and $60 damages alleged to have resulted from the breach
by the defendants of a contract to sell plaintiffs certain immov-
ables at a price of $6,000. Since the amount involved was held to
be $660, the appeal was transferred. In Heirs of P. L. Jacobs,
Incorporated v. Johnson27 defendant converted plaintiff's slander
of title suit into a petitory action, asserting ownership of the forty
acres of cut-over lands in himself. Since nothing in the record
showed the value of the land in controversy, and the mineral
21. Nash v. Curette, 218 La. 789, 51 So. 2d 51 (1951); Givens v..Town of
Ruston, 219 La. 672, 53 "So. 2d 833. (1951).
. 22. New Orleans & Northeastern R. Co. v. Redmann, 210 La. 525, 27 So 2d
321 (1946) and cases cited.
23. Ibid.
24. Prampin v. Southern Chemical Works, 218 La. 392, 49 So. 2d 737 (1950).
25. Meraux v. R. R. Barrow, Inc., 219 La. 309, 52 So. 2d 863 (1951).
26. 218 La. 200, 48 So. 2d 896 (1950).
27. 219 La. 125, 52 So. 2d 444 (1951).
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deeds and leases affecting the land, as being in excess of $2,000,
the appeal was transferred to the intermediate appellate court.
In one case,28 in which the plaintiff brought a jactitory action
for the purpose of having an alleged covenant running with the
land declared to be a personal obligation of one of plaintiff's
ancestors in title, a contract in the record disclosed that the
value of the restrictive covenant did not exceed $2,000. In view
of this, the supreme court held that it had no appellate juris-
diction and transferred the appeal.
In two cases the supreme court denied its appellate juris-
diction to review mandamus action. In the first 29 the State Board
of Health appealed from a judgment in favor of relator, com-
pelling the correction of a designation in its vital statistics records
from "colored" to "white." In the second8 ° relator appealed a
judgment refusing to mandamus the defendant dentistry board
to issue relator a license to practice dentistry, without requiring
him to take an examination and without imposing any other con-
ditions upon him. Both cases were held to have no "amount in
dispute or fund to be distributed" and consequently were trans-
ferred to the courts of appeal. Under their precise facts, both
decisions appear to be sound.
Two other appeals were similarly transferred, as not falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court. In one8 '
plaintiff had appealed the judgment rendered in a suit which he
had filed to annul a local-option liquor election. In the other 2 the
plaintiffs had appealed from an adverse judgment rendered in
their suit to enjoin the City of New Orleans from exchanging
properties with the Orleans Parish School Board. In both cases
the absence of an amount in dispute was held to deny appellate
jurisdiction in the supreme court.
Perhaps the most important decisions rendered by the su-
preme court during the last term in the entire field of civil pro-
cedure were the three cases 33 holding that the supreme court has
no appellate jurisdiction to review declaratory judgment actions.
28. Tucker v. Woodside, 218 La. 708, 50 So. 2d 814 (1951).
29. State ex rel. Treadway v. Louisiana State Board of Health, 218 La. 752,
51 So. 2d 41 (1951).
30.'Monitegut v. Louisiana State Board of Dentistry, 2i9 La: 307, 52 So.-2d
862 (1951).
31. Carter v. Richland Parish Police Jury, 218 La. 623, 50 So. 2d 293 (1951).
32. Blocker v. City of New Orleans, 218 La. 669, 50 So. 2d 643 (1951).
33. First Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. City of New Orleans, 218 La. 9, 48 So. 2d 145
(1950); Succession of Solari, 218 La. 671, 50 So. 2d 801 (1951); Board of Com'rs
of Port of New Orleans v. Hibernia Nat. Bank, 219 La. 208, 52, So. 753 (1951).
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In the leading case of this trio, First National Life Insurance
Company v. City of New Orleans,34 the matter was presented to
the trial court on the joint petition of plaintiff, defendant, and
Samuel Zemurray to obtain a declaratory judgment respecting
the validity of a proposed sale made by the municipality to plain-
tiff of certain property donated to the city by Zemurray to pro-
vide revenue for a charitable institution. The supreme court, on
its own motion, raised the question of its lack of appellate juris-
diction. Dividing the constitutional grant of appellate jurisdiction
to the state's highest court into seven different classifications, the
organ of the court pointed out that the only classification within
which the case could possibly be included was that providing for
the court's appellate jurisdiction where the amount in dispute or
the fund to be distributed, irrespective of the amount claimed,
exceeds $2,000 exclusive of interest. Pointing out that "there is
no issue in contest and the only matter that is presented to the
Court, as is stated in the prayer of the joint petition of the parties
is, 'A request for adjudication on the validity of the proposed sale
of the property involved in this controversy .. .'," the court could
find no "amount in dispute or fund to be distributed," and trans-
ferred the case to the court of appeal. No question was raised as
to whether the case presented a justiciable controversy, 35 even
under the Declaratory Judgments Act.
It is interesting to note that a slight shift in procedural
approach in this case would have side-stepped completely the
jurisdictional dangers presented. Had the city instituted a spe-
cific performance suit against the insurance company to compel
the latter to take title to the property in question, joining Zemur-
ray as a co-defendant, the "amount in dispute" would have been
the value of the property, and the supreme court clearly would
have had appellate jurisdiction.
In Succession of Solari3 6 the purchaser of property from the
universal legatee of the decedent brought a suit against all per-
sons who would have inherited from the decedent had she died
intestate, praying for a declaratory judgment decreeing the will
of decedent valid and confirming title to the property purchased.
The property in question was purchased by plaintiff from the
34. 218 La. 9, 48 So. 2d 145 (1950).
35. Cf. Coffman v. Breeze Corporations, 323 U.S. 316 (1945). The lack of
"adversary process" in the First NationaZ Life Insurance Company case
would appear to justify the fears which the late Sidney L. Herold expressed
in 32 La. State Bar Ass'n Rep. 61, 62 (1932).
36. 218 La. 671, 50 So. 2d 801 (1951).
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legatee for $350, while the entire estate of decedent amounted to
$45,000. All but two of decedent's heirs at law intervened, pray-
ing that the will be decreed valid, while the two who did not
intervene filed answers praying that the will be decreed invalid,
as presenting a prohibited substitution. From a judgment uphold-
ing the validity of the will, the two opponents thereof appealed
to the supreme court, and the appellees moved to dismiss the
appeal on the ground that only $350 was involved. The contention
of lack of appellate jurisdiction presented was found valid by the
supreme court, and the case was transferred to the intermediate
appellate court.
Board of Commissioners of Port of New Orleans v. Hibernia
National Bank3 7 presented an appeal by the defendant, named
trustee under a mortgage issued by plaintiff to secure an issue
of bonds, from a declaratory judgment rendered by the trial
court and holding that any lease granted by plaintiff primed the
rights of the trustee representing the bondholders. On a sugges-
tion by the appellee of a lack of appellate jurisdiction, the su-
preme court transferred the appeal to the court of appeal. The
result reached in this case, as in the other two declaratory judg-
ment decisions, seems quite correct, since the records in all three
of these cases failed to establish affirmatively the appellate juris-
diction of the court. But certain language of the opinion of the
supreme court in this case appears to embody a rather broad
generalization that may prove embarrassing in subsequent cases.
Thus, in the Hibernia National Bank case, the organ of the
court says: 38
"It seems apparent that a suit, having as its sole object the
judicial declaration of rights which do' not presently, and may
never, require enforcement is neither a monied demand nor one
in which the matter in contest can be said to be capable of mone-
tary appraisement. Manifestly, such an action involves merely
the declaration of a right made justiciable by statute .... and is
therefore appealable to the Court of Appeal under Section 29 of
Article 7 of the Constitution. .. ."
If, in the future, the court restricts this language to the
precise facts of the Hibernia National Bank case, no damage will
be done. Should the supreme court, however, have intended by
this language to have generalized a holding that it would never
have appellate jurisdiction over declaratory judgment cases, then
37. 219 La. 208, 52 So. 2d 753 (1951).
38. 52 So. 2d 753, 754.
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this decision is to be deplored. Admittedly, it will be much more
difficult to establish affirmatively the appellate jurisdiction of the
supreme court in declaratory judgment cases than in other types
of actions; and admittedly, there will be some declaratory judg-
ment cases which should go on appeal to the supreme court and
in which the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court will not
be established affirmatively by the record. Yet there will be
some cases where it will prove no more difficult to determine the
"amount in dispute" than in petitory actions or suits to recover
damages for breach of contract. 9
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Scott v. Scott4 ° presented two very interesting questions. In
this case, plaintiff had appealed from a judgment granting him a
divorce under the two-year separation statute, and ordering him
to pay alimony. Whether his appeal was taken from the entire
judgment, or only from that portion ordering him to pay alimony,
represented the first issue in the case, as the appellee contended
that no appeal could be taken from a judgment of divorce more
than thirty days after its effective date. Examining the language
of the petition of appeal, which alleged that petitioner was ag-
grieved from that part of the judgment ordering to pay alimony
and desired to appeal devolutively therefrom, the court experi-
enced no difficulty in finding that the appeal was only from that
portion of the judgment ordering plaintiff to pay alimony, and
hence was sued out timely. The second ground of appellee's
motion to dismiss the appeal was based upon the claim that "the
appellant has made an unconditional, voluntary, and absolute
acquiescence in the judgment." To support this contention,
appellee was able to show only that the appellant had made ali-
mony payments due under the judgment, and, in a rule 'taken
against him by the wife to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt for failure to make certain alimony pay-
39. One illustration of this type of case is Succession of Solari, 218 La.
671, 677, 50 So. 2d 801, 802 (1951), where the court said "the dispute in this case
resolves itself to the ownership of a piece of property valued at $350." Had
the property been valued at $3,500, semble the court would have accepted
appellate jurisdiction of the case.
A much more typical case would be a declaratory judgment action to
interpret a contract for the sale of commodities, In instances where the lan-
guage providing either the maximum or minimum quantities might be ambig-
uous. If the market had increased or dropped sharply since the execution of
the contract, it would be just as easy to determine mathematically the
"amount in dispute" as if the action had been one for damages for breach
of contract.
40. 218 La. 211, 48 So. 2d 899 (1950).
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ments, had reconvened asking that the alimony judgment be
amended so that he would not be required to pay any alimony
whatsoever. The fact that appellant had paid alimony, and,
before the appeal, had sought to be relieved from payment of
alimony, was held not to constitute any acquiescence in the
judgment.
In Coney v. Coney4l the wife originally, on January 27, 1950,
obtained a suspensive appeal from a judgment signed on that
date, in divorce and property settlement litigation, conditioned
on her furnishing bond in the sum of $7,500. Complaining that
this appeal bond was excessive, the wife invoked the super-
visory jurisdiction of the supreme court to reduce the amount
thereof. On her application, the court issued the usual alterna-
tive writs. After the hearing the supreme court refused to
grant applicant relief in the matter of the reduction of the bond;
but as the remainder of the thirty-day period allowed for taking
an appeal from a judgment of divorce had elapsed while the
wife's application for supervisory writs was pending, the court
granted her six additional days from the finality of its judgment
to appeal from the divorce judgment and allowed thirty days
from the finality of the supreme court's judgment for the tran-
script of appeal from the divorce judgment to be lodged in the
appellate court. Within fourteen days of the supreme court's
opinion, the wife applied for a rehearing. Before her application
for rehearing could be acted upon, the wife presented a motion
to the supreme court, showing that she had previously filed the
$7,500 appeal bond, but alleging that sixty days additional would
be required by the clerk of the trial court to complete the tran-
script of appeal. The supreme court thereupon rendered an order,
dismissing the application for rehearing as now being moot, and
granting the wife an additional sixty days from the finality of
the order to have the transcript of appeal in the divorce case
lodged in the appellate court. The transcript of appeal was not
delivered to the office of the clerk of the supreme court until the
sixtieth day; and as this was a Saturday (a holiday in Orleans
Parish), the transcript was not actually filed until Monday, the
next judicial day.
Based upon these facts, the appellee moved to dismiss on the
grounds (1) that the appeal bond was not furnished within the
required legal delay, as the supreme court was without power to
extend the statutory limitation of thirty days for taking an appeal
41. 218 La. 218, 48 So. 2d 902 (1950).
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from a divorce judgment; and (2) the transcript of appeal was
not filed in the appellate court timely. The first contention was
swept aside with the statement that regardless of the merits of
the contention advanced, the court's ruling in the first opinion
was now the law of the case and could not be altered. The second
ground for the motion to dismiss was overruled under a holding
that, since the last day of the sixty day extension was a holiday,
a filing of the transcript of appeal on the next judicial day was
timely.42
The remaining case involving appellate procedure applied
well settled principles.43
REAL ACTIONS
Sims v. State Mineral Board4 4 established no far-reaching
procedural precedents, but nonetheless was a very interesting
case. The plaintiff, alleging himself to be the owner of certain
property in Calcasieu Parish and in corporeal possession thereof
for more than a year, and claiming that defendants were slan-
dering his title to the oil, gas, and other minerals under the land
by having caused a mineral lease granted by the mineral board
to the other defendant to be placed of record, prayed that defen-
dants be ordered to disclaim or assert any right, title, or owner-
ship in the property and in the oil, gas, and minerals thereunder,
and for the cancellation of the mineral lease issued by the mineral
board to the other defendant. The defendant mineral board filed
its answer, converting the suit into a petitory action and, setting
up its ownership of the property. The other defendant failed to
answer, and the suit was dismissed as to it.
The issue as to the ownership of the property resolved itself
into a determination of whether one Poe, to whom the state had
issued a patent and one of plaintiff's ancestors in title, was the
42. On this last point, compare Vicknair v. Vicknair, 211 La. 159, 29 So.
2d 706 (1947), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1947-1948 Term, 8 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 261, 273 (1948). The two cases are
distinguishable, since in the Vicknair case the extension granted by the court
was not for a certain number of days but rather through "the 19th day of
October, 1946."
43. Fisher v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 218 La.
243, 48 So. 2d 911 (1950) reiterated the rule that the one year period allowed
by Art. 593, La. Code of Practice of 1870, for taking a devolutive appeal is the
limit of time within which the appeal must be completed by the filing of
the bond.
Succession of Tullier, 218 La, 1005, 51 So. 2d 606 (1951) literally applied
the language of Art. 890, La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended by La. Act
103 of 1908, requiring an answer to the appeal to be filed generally more than
three days prior to the date assigned for argument, to be considered.
44. 219 La. 342, 53 So. 2d 124 (1951).
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tax debtor or had the legal right to redeem the property from
the state, to which it had been adjudicated for unpaid taxes.
Under the pertinent constitutional provision,4 if Poe had no
interest in the land at the time he acquired it from the state, the
mineral rights in the land were reserved to the sovereign; if Poe
was the tax debtor, or otherwise had the legal right to redeem
the property, the transfer to him conveyed full mineral rights in
the land. The sheriff's adjudication to Poe stated that he was
"the owner thereof and entitled to full interest in the said prop-
erty." Furthermore, under the law, the sale of the property to
Poe for less than its assessed value could have been made only
if Poe had the legal right to redeem the property.
After the mineral board had filed its answer, plaintiff took a
rule against it for judgment on the pleadings and filed exceptions
of estoppel and prescription. On the trial of the rule for judg-
ment on th6 pleadings, the mineral board introduced the tax
adjudication to the state for unpaid taxes, the proces verbal of
the adjudication from the state to Poe, and the patent from the
state to Poe, confirming this adjudication. 46 On the face of this
evidence the trial court rendered judgment rejecting the mineral
board's demands and recognizing plaintiff as owner of the min-
erals under the land in question. From this judgment the mineral
board appealed.
In the face of the evidence introduced by the mineral board
itself, showing no reservation of the minerals in the state at the
time the property was adjudicated to Poe, and at least indicating
that Poe had a legal right to redeem the property and reacquire
the minerals, the court was compelled to affirm that portion of
the judgment appealed from dismissing the mineral board's peti-
tory action. However, since plaintiff had not prayed to be decreed
the owner of the minerals under the law, that portion of the
judgment appealed from recognizing ownership therein in plain-
tiff was set aside.
PARTITION
In Norah v. Crawford47 plaintiff sought to effect a partition
of certain immovable property, on the ground that he and defen-
dant were the owners thereof in indivision, plaintiff having
45. La. Const. of 1921, Art. IV, § 2.
46. Technically, under La. R.S. (1950) 13:3601 (4) the rule for judgment
is triable on the face of the papers and no evidence is admissible. Here,
plaintiff apparently acquiesced in defendant's introduction of the docu-
mentary evidence.
47. 218 La. 433, 49 So, 2d 751 (1950).
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inherited his deceased mother's one-half ownership thereof.
Defendant answered, denying plaintiff's ownership of the prop-
erty. Defendant then instituted a direct action in the mortuary
proceedings, alleging that the judgment recognizing the partition
plaintiff as the sole heir of decedent was an absolute nullity,
having been obtained through the fraud and ill practices of the
alleged heir. The latter excepted to the petition in the nullity
action, on the ground that it did not disclose a right or cause of
action, and these exceptions were sustained and the nullity action
dismissed.
Subsequently, defendant in the partition action filed a supple-
mental answer in such suit, alleging that the judgment of pos-
session relied on by the plaintiff therein was a nullity, having
been obtained through the fraud and ill practices of plaintiff. To
this defense the plaintiff pleaded res adjudicata, and this plea was
sustained by the trial court, which ordered the partition. On the
appeal the majority of the court held that the defense urged in
the partition action was not concluded by the prior unsuccessful
nullity action for three reasons: (1) the issue in the nullity action
was the right' or lack of interest in the plaintiff to attack the
judgment of possession, quite different from the issue in the
partition action; (2) the thing adjudged in the nullity action
was the lack of any interest in the plaintiff therein to bring such
an action, which is not involved in the partition case; and (3) the
parties were not appearing in the same quality in the two actions:
plaintiff in the nullity action being a rank interloper, while in the
partition suit he was made a defendant because of his quality as
owner of an undivided one-half interest in the property. One of
the justices dissented from the reversal of the judgment ap-
pealed from.
The only other case handed down during the past term
involving partition procedure was decided on a factual issue.
48
MISCELLANEOUS
In the procedure of most civilian jurisdictions, the counter-
part of the common law doctrine of "election of remedies" is
48. Walker v. Chapital, 218'La. 663, 50 So. 2d 641 (1951), where both the
trial and appellate courts decided that the evidence did not establish the
defense of agreement to hold the property in indivision for a term. Two
important questions of law were presented, but were not decided by the
courts: (1) whether an agreement to hold immovables in indivision for a
definite period must be in writing; and (2) whether in the absence of a
stipulation to the contrary the term of such an agreement, even when in
writing, is limited to five years, under Art. 1300, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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"concurrence of actions, ' 49 a subject derived from and closely
akin to "cumulation of actions." In its early history, Louisiana
made quite considerable headway towards a development of its
own rules of concurrence of actions through application of the
principles governing a cumulation of actions.50 Full development
of the subject, however, was prevented when the supreme court
took the path of least resistance through an adoption of the doc-
trine of election of remedies.51 In Brown v. Lancaster52 the
supreme court reached its decision through the application of
the analogy of the principles of cumulation of action, as well as
the rules of election of remedies. Since the plaintiff had first
sued the real estate broker and its surety for the recovery of the
deposit, and had been partially successful by obtaining a com-
promise from the surety, plaintiff was not permitted to institute
subsequently an inconsistent action for specific performance of
the agreement to buy and sell the property.
In Anderson v. Merriman plaintiff instituted suit for a judi-
cial dissolution of a partnership and for an accounting from the
defendant. Alleging that, the day prior to the filing of his suit,
plaintiff had withdrawn $10,000 from the partnership accounts,
and that the withholding of these funds would deprive the court
of the opportunity of granting the major portion of the relief
requested, defendant ruled plaintiff into court to show cause why
this amount should not be restored to the partnership accounts or
at least deposited into the registry of the court, under penalty of
dismissal of the account. To reverse a judgment of the trial court
making this rule absolute, plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to
invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the supreme court. There-
after, plaintiff having failed to restore the funds in question, the
suit was dismissed. On appeal from the judgment of dismissal
the supreme court found no authority or precedent for the trial
court's action and reversed the judgment of the court below.
The appellate court was of the opinion plaintiff could not be com-
pelled to restore these partnership funds as a prerequisite to the
maintenance of his suit for a dissolution of the partnership and
for an accounting.
49. Millar, The Joinder of Actions in Continental Civil Procedure, 28 Ill.
L. Rev. 26, 28 (1933).
50. Adams v. Lewis, 7 Mart. (N.S.) 400 (La. 1829), applying the code pro-
visions relating to cumulation of actions to two inconsistent, but separate,
actions.
51. Lowenstein v. Glass, 48 La. Ann. 1422, 20 So. 890 (1896). See also R. B.
George Machinery Co. v. New Orleans, T. & M.R. Co., 167 La. 474, 119 So.
432 (1929).
52. 218 La. 1036, 51 So. 2d 617 (1951).
53. 218 La. 157, 48 So. 2d 641 (1950).
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